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A new crop insurance model based on just random risk (natural states) is presented 
instead of traditional model based on random risk, guaranteed price, and guaranteed 
yield.  The simulation approach shows how the incentive compatibility constraints 
resolve the moral hazard problem by the insured under the insurer-agency crop insurance 
contracting.    




  For decades, multiple peril crop insurance has been the focus of crop performance 
risk management in the U.S. agriculture.  These programs have complemented price and 
income policy that significantly reduced price related risk.  Following reforms in federal 
policy that moved farm prices to market determination, private sector-based or public 
sector supported insurance strategies became attractive as means for managing income 
and financial risk in agriculture.  However, the challenges of successfully implementing 
these types of strategies were well known.  Performance of past crop yield insurance 
schemes had clarified that not only would such approaches not be of interest to the 
private sector, but they were generally not financially viable and politically defensible 
approaches for public sector intervention.   In United States, indemnity payments on such 
insurance schemes have consistently exceeded premium income for the insurers, even in 
years of good weather conditions.  Internationally, similar results have occurred.  
Premiums have not covered indemnity and administrative costs (Quiggin, 1994).  As a 
result, private insurers have left the crop insurance market leaving the agricultural sector 
ripe for solutions to manage yield, price, and related income risk.   The objective of this 
paper is to provide an illustration of how simulation methods can be used to quantify the 
nature of the malperformance of crop insurance and to success how those failures might 
be mitigated or eliminated.      
  The reasons for crop insurance market failure have been identified through a 
series of past studies, see e.g. Quiggin, 1986; Quiggin, 1994; Schmitz et al., 1994, Coble 
et al., 1997; Miranda et al, 1997; Mahul, 1999.  These studies agree that two features of 
the agricultural insurance setting can be blamed for crop insurance failure: systemic risk 
and information asymmetry.   Systemic risk can be defined in several ways, however, in 
this setting it is risk that can not be offset through pooling of insureds.  This follows from 
the fact that insureds, drawn from a feasibly diversified spatial base, remain exposed to a 
common risk, or loss generating mechanism.   In the agricultural setting, a good example 
is weather-related loss in yields.  Further, actual losses are typically not predictable, 
complicating the feasibility of offsetting the risk through diversification, either spatially 
or otherwise.   Information asymmetry characterizes the crop insurance setting due to  
differential information concerning production practices and growing conditions held by 
insureds (farmers) and the insurers.  Existence of information asymmetry results in two 
behavioral responses that increase the costs of insurance and challenge the efficacy of 
private financing of insurance: adverse selection and moral hazard problem.  Adverse 
selection occurs when due to information asymmetry, offers of insurance are found more 
attractive by potential insureds that have higher risk of loss than does the general 
population.  The result is that the pool of insureds is more risky than the general 
population and the risk reduction benefits of a diversified pool are not fully achieved.  
This increases the cost of insurance.  Under full information, insurance could be designed 
to be attractive for purchase by all members of the heterogeneous population of potential 
insureds.  Moral hazard occurs when insureds change their production practices in 
response to the risk reduction offered by insurance resulting in an increase in risk 
exposure beyond that which would exist if they retained their pre-insurance production 
plan.  The effect of this behavioral response is the post-insurance risk reduction is smaller 
than in the absence of moral hazard.   




    In this paper, we focus on quantification of moral hazard in crop insurance.  To 
begin, we review and extent the specification of Coble et al. (1997) where limited 
comparative statics were reported with respect to changes in moral hazard with respect to 
the guaranteed yield and expected indemnity levels.  This specification is extended to 
allow for a principal agent specification.  Next, the specification is implemented within a 
simulation context to generate quantitative results that allow for consideration of the 
nature of, extent of, and sensitivity of moral hazard that goes well beyond results 
available from a strictly theoretical approach.   We present results under risk neutrality 
and under risk aversion for agent insureds.  Importantly, by applying a contracting 
framework, the insurance design goes beyond simple zero profit rules for pricing and 
implements pricing and indemnity design that ensures participation across a 
heterogeneous population, allowing for reduction in adverse selection.   
  Relating this contribution to past work, reduction of moral hazard has been 
considered within the context of area yield insurance schemes, (see Miranda, 1991; Smith 
et al., 1994; Skees et al., 1997; Mahul, 1999; Ramaswami et al., 2001) and specific event-
based insurance schemes such as rainfall insurance (see Quiggin, 1994; Turvey, 1999).  
However, both approaches are imperfect solutions.  Area yield insurance fails to offer 
insurance against individual risk  while special event-based insurance  fails to offer 
optimal indemnity schedules.  In contrast, this paper suggests two new insurance schemes 
to resolve moral hazard problem that extent ideas within these two past approaches: use 
of incentive compatibility constraints in a contract design-based insurance scheme to 
manage moral hazard and optimal yield-based contracts.  Though these approaches also 
have flaws, they appear to offer improved performance relative to traditional multiperil 
crop insurance.   
  The remained of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, a review 
of the market failure of crop insurance is offered and basic notation is introduced.  Next, 
the detection of the existence of  and measurement of the extent of moral hazard in crop 
insurance markets is considered.  Finally, results of simulation-based design of insurance 
is presented.    
Crop insurance market failure 
  We consider first the role of systematic risk as a problem in insurance design.  
While many past studies have attributed insurance failures to information asymmetry and 
resulting moral hazard and adverse selection (see e.g. Miranda et al., 1997), systematic 
risk also plays a key role.   
  Following the financial literature where the term ‘systemic risk’ was first used, 
systemic risk is risk that is not diversifiable through portfolio allocation.  In a financial 
setting it is general market risk.  In contrast,  non-systemic risk can be diversified by 
making a portfolio of investment assets (Eisenburg et al., 2001).  In insurance, systemic 
risk can be considered to be factors that affect all participants in insurance that generate a 
significant correlation across individual insured performance.  In agriculture, systematic 
risk follows primarily from geographically common weather and specific events such as 
droughts of extreme temperatures.  Following financial literature, systemic yield risk can 
be modeled by partitioning crop yield:  




where  i y %  is actual individual yield,  i m  is the average of individual yield representing the 
“risk free” yield across the population, while  y %  is the area yield and  m  is the average of 
area yield,  their difference reflecting the systematic risk in the area,  i e %  is the non-
systemic risk impacting the individual, and  i b  is the measure of sensitivity of individual 
yield to systemic factors.   Equation 1) indicates that while the nonsystematic risk across 
individuals may be independent, the systematic risk induces interdependence across 
individuals.  In fact, the high magnitude of this correlation renders pooling of individuals 
to reduce portfolio risk ineffective,  increasing the cost of private insurance that covers 
this remaining nondiversified risk.   Following Quiggin (1986), the total variance of an 
insurer’s portfolio can be written:  
2) 
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when n is large and n is the number of individuals, t is correlation among risks, s is the 
variance of returns from growing, n is the proportion of risk insured, and h is the ratio 
between the variance of the pre-existing portfolio and the variance of the insurance pool.  
In equation 2), system risk increases in t, implying the total variance of the insurer’s 
portfolio is also increased.     
While risk pooling across insureds fails when correlation of risk is high, portfolio 
strategies going beyond the pool of insureds can easily offset any pool’s systematic risk.  
Intuitively, all that is required is diversification into other risks that are uncorrelated with 
the systematic risk.  This is the essence of reinsurance through either private or public 
sector mechanisms.    
  The second source of market failure in crop insurance follows from information 
asymmetry between farmers and the insurers: adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Because the focus of this paper is on the moral hazard, the discussion about adverse 
selection is kept brief and that of moral hazard is extended.   
Adverse selection arises when the insured farmer has more information than the insurer.  
In crop insurance, three examples of adverse selection based on particular information 
asymmetries are often cited in the  literature, see e.g. Quiggin (1994)  .  First, given 
asymmetry in yield distribution, participation is biased toward farmers that have expected 
indemnity in excess of premia.   Second, through annual renewal participation will be 
biased toward farmers that expect temporally anomalous losses, e.g. following a year of 
large pest infestations, or high snow falls that are likely to result in reduced germination 
rates.   Third, potential insureds may exploit local knowledge of land potential, biasing 
insured fields to those with higher yield risk.  
Moral hazard  follows froim information asymmetry with respect to insured choices. 
Absence of observability at a reasonable cost allows insureds to change production plans, 
altering the risk reduction achieved through insurance and thereby altering the risk of the 
pool.    As illustrated in figure 1, in the absence of moral hazard, when the outcome of e 
<e* is insured, the insurer  pays an indemnity of price * {f(x*,e*) - f(x*,e’)}.  In contrast, 
if behavioral response to insurance is allowed, the indemnity would be price * {f(x*,e*) - 
f(x’,e’)}.  In this case, risk-reducing inputs are reduced in application.  Therefore,  the 







Figure 1. Moral Hazard 
 
 
Modeling moral hazard  
Coble et al. (1997) consider a limited number of the comparative-statics of moral 
hazard in crop insurance.  They examine the effect of an increased in guaranteed yield on 
the optimal amount of controllable inputs and on the expected indemnity.   Their basic 
model may be written as follows; 
3) 
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where e* is the trigger state where the loss of farms starts, the wealth of low yield case: 
WL = W 0 + A[pf(x, e) - rx + pg{y*- f(x, e)} - pgy*g(y*)] if e <e*, the wealth of high yield 
case: WH = W 0 + A[pf(x, e) - rx - pgy*g (y*)] if e > e*, W0 is the beginning wealth, A is 
acres,  g (y*) is premium rate that is the function of the guaranteed yield,  y is the 
observable yield, y* is the guaranteed yield that is the function of the production ability, p 
is the deterministic product price, pg is the guaranteed price, r is the input price, f(x, e) is 
the production function (fe(x, e)>0), g(e) is the density function of random state of nature. 
Comparative-statics for the effect of the increase of y* on the x is considered as an 
indicator of moral hazard:  






























 is ambiguous.  They 
further note that even if the behavioral response to insurance were observable, whether 




need to be determined.  Thus, the issue of interest is not addressable through single 
comparative-static results.   
  To consider the impact of insurance coverage on the expected indemnity, they 
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and evaluate the impact of a change in y*.   By definition, moral hazard exists when: 
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.  (The first term of right hand side is the impact 
of y* when the insured keep the same amount of inputs as when uninsured and the second 
term is the impact of y* when the amount of inputs used is changed following the change 
of y*.)  Thus, 6) can be rewritten as:  
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,  moral hazard will exist whenever  






.  This might be expected if all inputs 
are risk-reducing.  In general, the problem is far more complicated and requires 
consideration within a multiple input, multiple output setting.  
Empirical consideration of moral hazard through simulation   
To proceed, we illustrate a new approach to the consideration of moral hazard 
based on simulation.  We consider variants of the Coble et al. (1994) model and evaluate 
the extent and variation of insurance impacts on insureds and insurer under risk neutrality 
and risk aversion.   The simulation is implemented through specification of the producer 
cost function and the distribution of the process generating the randomness in yield.  








         : no insurance agent               : insured ,          : the insurer  
Figure 2. The behavior of expected profit functions and optimal contracting points 
 
 
The results of the simulation provide a significant extension of knowledge concerning the 
nature of moral hazard.  First, in green is plotted the reservation expected income for the 
insured under no insurance.  Under insurance, participation requires  at least that level of 
expected profits.  Now, consider the full information case.  Here, the insurer, agency 
earns a maximum expected profit (356.85) guaranteeing the reservation expected profit 
(274.54) for agents at an optimal guarantee price of  2.52.  The insurer cannot set the 
guarantee price higher that this optimal level without losing particpation by the agent.  
This constitutes the optimal insurance outcome under no moral hazard.     
Next, consider the case of asymmetric information.  Suppose that the agency can 
only  observe the output rather than the amount of variable inputs used by agents.  In this 
case, moral hazard will exist.  From Figure 2 it is clear that as the guarantee price is 
varied the cost of moral hazard changes first increasing, then decreasing.   To ensure 
participation, application of an incentive compatibility would lead the insurer to set the 
optimal guaranteed price at point B (with guarantee price of 16.80).    In our model, the 
guaranteed price is decreasing in the amount of variable inputs used.  It follows that 




though expected profit is the same.  Because of this reduction in the amount of variable 
inputs used and the increased indemnity, the insurer agency loses expected profit (the 
difference 356.85-279.95=76.9) between the expected profit in point A and the expected 
profit in point B.  This is the cost of moral hazard.   
Thus, the moral hazard costs can be studied through simulation in greater detail 
than simply at a theoretic level.  In fact, based on our specification, we show that the 
sensitivity of moral hazard to the guarantee price is determinant, not indeterminant as 
Coble et al. found.  Further, we see the comparative-statics are nonlinear.  
 
Risk averse case 
Next, we examine moral hazard cost under the assumption that both agency and 
agents are risk averse.  The results are in figure 3.     
            
         : non-contracting case,         : the insured under contracting,         :  the insurer under 
contracting 
 
Figure 3. The behavior of expected utility functions and optimal contracting points 
 
We can use the same logic to explain these results as was applied in the case of 
risk neutrality.  In figure 3, point A (at guarantee price 3.11) presents the optimal 
guaranteed price under full information.  The insurer earns maximum expected utility 
(365.55) guaranteeing the reservation expected utility (241.30) for agents.  However, if 
we assume a symmetric information, the optimal guaranteed price is set on point B 
(13.84). Again, given our specification that the guaranteed price is decreasing in the Designing Crop Insurance to Manage Moral Hazard Costs  
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amount of variable inputs use, agents reduce variable input use, earning increased  
indemnity at point B than in point A, though their  expected utility is unchanged.  
Because of variable inputs are reduced and indemnity increased, the insurer agency loses 
expected utility (365.55-285.71=79.84) between the expected utility in point A and the 
expected utility in point B.  This is the cost of moral hazard.  As seen so far, the moral 
hazard cost can be quantified in the model based on the model of Coble et al. even under 
complications such as risk aversion. 
 
Conclusion 
  Moral hazard costs that occur when the insurers can not observe the actions taken 
by insured farmers constitute an important reason for failure of crop insurance schemes.  
As illustrated by the simulation results, these costs can be substantial depending on how 
the guaranteed price is set.  However, the simulations also highlighted that moral hazard 
costs can be managed through the design of the insurance.  In fact, moral hazard costs can 
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